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Europeanness of Lithuanian Political Elite:  
Europhilia, Russophobia and Neoliberalism 
Irmina Matonyte, Gintaras Šumskas & Vaidas Morkevičius ∗ 
Abstract: »Europäizität der litauischen politischen Elite. Europhilie, Russopho-
bie und Neoliberalismus«. The article describes and analyzes the evolution of 
Lithuanian political elite’s attitudes towards the European Union (EU) and its 
governance during the past decade (2004-2016). First, it reviews changes in the 
composition of Lithuania’s political elite and assesses EU related policy deci-
sions, which reveal the complex interrelations between national and suprana-
tional politics in a small but illustrative post-communist state. Second, it pre-
sents an analysis of the Lithuanian political elite’s attitudes, which were 
surveyed in 2007, 2009 and 2014; it examines trends in the elite’s attachment 
to Europe, their perceptions of threats to EU cohesion, changes in the levels of 
their trust in EU institutions, their conceptions of European governance, and 
their stances towards the management of financial and economic crisis. Com-
paring the three surveys captures evolution of the attitudes of the by and large 
consensually pro-European Lithuanian political elite. The Europeanness of the 
Lithuanian political elite also increases, an attitude which appears to be more a 
response to Russia-induced geopolitical destabilization than to the 2008 finan-
cial crisis. 
Keywords: Lithuania, European Union, Russia, financial crisis of 2008, affective 
attachment, threat, governance, political parties and ideologies. 
1.  Introduction1 
The expanding field of European studies generally treats small post-communist 
states such as Lithuania and the other Baltic states only marginally, and empiri-
cal research studies are rare. Lithuania’s size and relatively recent date of join-
ing the EU (it became a full-fledged EU member-state in 2004) partially ex-
plain this neglect. We argue, however, that it is precisely these two features, the 
small size of the state and the newness of its EU membership, that are the main 
determinates of the Europeanness (Best, Lengyel, and Verzichelli, 2012) of the 
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post-communist Lithuanian political elites; whose identities and interests re-
flect national, supra-national and international agendas, developing on the 
eastern border of the EU.  
In this paper we describe and analyze the evolution of the attitudes of Lithu-
anian political elites towards the EU and its governance during the past decade. 
We start in 2004, when Lithuania joined the EU, and track their attitudes 
through to 2015, when Lithuania implemented two landmark decisions, name-
ly, introducing the euro, and diversifying its supply of energy resources, there-
by reducing its dependency on natural gas imports from Russia. In particular, 
our attention is focused on revealing the continuous consensual pro-
Europeanness of national political elites and, despite the dramatic downturn of 
the economy after the global financial crisis in 20082, the paradoxical strength-
ening of the neo-liberalism, nationalism and Europhilia amongst Lithuania’s 
political class. We argue that this somewhat counterintuitive development is 
best explained by the preoccupying concern of Lithuania’s elites to safeguard 
their young and small post-communist nation-state against internal and external 
threats. The internal threat Lithuanian elites are most likely to fear is opportun-
istic populism. Externally, elites are very wary of Russia’s increasing authori-
tarianism and imperialism, and are also concerned about a number of ongoing 
economic, social and political developments in the EU.  
In the first section, we briefly review the national political discourse and 
certain policy decisions as they pertain to the Europeanization of Lithuania. We 
emphasize that its pro-European trajectory was invariably supported by an 
ideologically diverse series of coalition governments in Lithuania during the 
period of 2004-2015. We also provide a detailed account of the structural 
changes in the composition of the parliamentary elite in Lithuania; after be-
coming a fully-fledged member-state of the EU in 2004, Lithuania has experi-
enced three regular national parliamentary elections (in 2004, 2008, and 2012)3. 
We end the section by briefly introducing the notion of Europeanness and 
formulate a number of research questions.  
The second, major part of the article presents an analysis of the attitudes of 
Lithuania’s political elite, drawn from representative survey data collected 
from interviews with Lithuanian MPs in 2007, 2009 and 2014. We examine 
trends of the Lithuanian political elite’s attachment to Europe, their perceptions 
of threats to the EU, the levels of their trust in EU institutions, their concep-
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tions of European governance, and finally, their stances towards the EU’s man-
agement of the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath.  
Comparing three sets of surveys (each of them conducted with MPs elected 
in three different regular national elections), we try to capture the EU-related 
attitudinal shifts of the by and large consensually pro-European Lithuanian 
political elite. We then measure the scope of changes in the Europeanness of 
Lithuanian political elites, which reflects EU-level developments, is affected by 
the protracted financial-economic crisis, and is altered by Russian-led regional 
geopolitical destabilization. 
In the final section we summarize the most compelling explanations that ac-
count for Lithuania’s political elite’s rising Europeanness over the past decade. 
We observe a remarkably resilient pro-European neoliberal mindset amongst 
Lithuania’s elite; it is expressed most plainly in political elites’ neglect of so-
cial security, their propensity to support economic retrenchment and fiscal 
thrift, their identification of Russia as an existential threat, and their strong 
emotional attachment to Europe. 
2.  Lithuania in the EU: European in Form, National in 
Substance? 
The Europeanisation of Lithuania (i.e., its functional integration into the EU, 
the Europeanization of its public policies, etc.) has inspired and rallied the 
Lithuanian political elite and population since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. The understanding of the EU’s founders that solitary nation-states 
would struggle to face global challenges if they relied exclusively on their own 
national resources is an idea that resonates strongly in post-communist Lithua-
nia. The normative and affective willingness to be a part of Europe after their 
freedom from the Soviet regime is prevalent among Lithuanian elites and is 
reinforced by strategic calculations: they view EU membership as a safe har-
bor, sheltering them from major geo-political and financial-economic turbu-
lence, which they are particularly vulnerable to given the small size of their 
nation and its proximity to Russia.  
2.1  General Overview of the Lithuanian Political Elites’ Views 
Towards the EU  
Lithuania became a member of the EU in May 2004, and both its population and 
its elites are largely enthusiastic and optimistic about the EU. In September 2015, 
the Eurobarometer poll showed that for 55% of Lithuanians the EU conjures up a 
positive image, compared to the EU average of 41% (Eurobarometer, 83).  
In the mid-1990s, when Lithuania’s prospect of joining the EU was gaining 
momentum, its political elites strongly supported integration. Lithuania’s Asso-
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  153 
ciation Treaty with the EU was signed in 1995. All mainstream Lithuanian 
political parties agreed that the country needed to Europeanize, i.e., liberalize 
markets, promote democratic practices, respect human rights, and of special 
significance, to re-build its Western identity (Baldwin 1995) while distancing 
itself from its former dependency on Russia (Elsuwege 2008). Except for the 
law on land ownership by foreigners4, there were no major controversies on the 
harmonization of national law and the adoption of acquis communautaire. The 
crucial issue for the Lithuanian elite was to join the EU as smoothly and as 
quickly as possible.  
During the period of Lithuania’s accession to the EU, the major difference 
among the essentially Europhile Lithuanian political parties rested in their 
perception of the speed and depth of reforms: the center-right parties favored 
radical and deep reforms, while the left and center-left wing parties advocated a 
slower pace (Jurkynas 2004). Eurosceptic attitudes were expressed by national-
ist parties, but their paltry numbers (only two or three parliamentary members) 
illustrates just how marginal Euroscepticism was at the time. 
In the first years of EU membership, Lithuania reconfirmed its Europhilia 
on numerous occasions. The Lithuanian Seimas ratified the ill-fated EU Consti-
tution as early as November 11, 2004. When the EU Constitution failed and its 
abridged version, the Lisbon Treaty, was presented, Lithuanian parliamentari-
ans endorsed it without much hesitation on the eve of the Day of Europe, 8 
May 2008. A special decision-making procedure that Lithuania widely uses in 
the process of adoption (transposition) of EU rules and directives accelerates 
parliamentary deliberations, omits the phase of extended debates in the stand-
ing committees, and in effect is a means to “economize” lengthy discussions 
and hasten adoption (Matonyte 2015a). 
Since the restoration of its post-communist statehood, the Lithuanian politi-
cal class has been eagerly integrating itself into the EU as a supra-national 
polity. The crème de la crème of its national political elite is driven by ambi-
tions for EU level careers (Matonytė and Šumskas 2014, Matonytė 2015b). In 
the European Parliament elections of 2004, 2009 and, albeit to a lesser degree, 
2014, all major Lithuanian parties adopted positive attitudes towards European 
integration, endorsed the visa-free Schengen area, and the single currency euro. 
Only minor parties expressed worries about the loss of sovereignty, cultural 
identity, and criticized the cumbersome European bureaucracy. Overall, from 
2004-2009 the Lithuanian political elite’s support for a strong and unified 
Europe was virtually universal. During the EP elections in 2014, when as a 
consequence of the protracted economic crisis most of the EU member-states 
were struggling with growing discontent and rampant Euroscepticism (Viola 
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2015), the Lithuanian political elite did express more criticism towards the EU 
than was usual for it. However, its majority remained largely positive and only 
slim divides separated the pro-European Social-Democrats, Conservatives and 
Liberals. The elections produced only 2 Eurosceptic MEPs in the 11-seat strong 
Lithuanian delegation in the EP 2014. 
In terms of strategic national policies, during the first years of EU (and 
NATO) membership, the Lithuanian political elite made a number of vital 
decisions, revealing the character of its Europeanness. First, it decided to join 
the euro-zone in 2007 (although this first attempt failed due to its level of infla-
tion, marginally bypassing the norms set by the EC). Second, inspired by the 
Common Security and Defense Policy and by the German example, in 2008 
Lithuania decided to abolish the national conscript army (it should be noted 
that the crisis in Ukraine prompted Lithuania to reintroduce conscription in 
2015). These and other patently pro-European decisions were largely supported 
by the leading political authorities and acclaimed across the political spectrum.  
In addition, all post-communist Lithuanian presidents have been unequivo-
cally pro-European, and depending on their personalities, political sensibilities 
and competences, they have been consistently engaged in the widening and 
deepening of EU integration. There is a famous axiom in Lithuania that the 
semi-presidential regime engenders tensions between president and parliament. 
However, the European agenda in Lithuania does not provoke any grave strains 
between the two institutions: on the contrary, the Lithuanian President and 
Seimas are in something of a contest to display just how exemplary their re-
spective pro-European bona fides are. EU issues unite these two otherwise 
conflict-prone political institutions and foster common ground for the pluralist 
parliamentary elites.  
2.2  Composition of the Parliamentary Elites in 2004, 2008 and 
2014, and a Note on Lithuania’s National Economic Austerity 
Policies post-2008  
Since 1992 the unicameral Lithuanian Seimas is elected in regular parliamen-
tary elections every four years. The post-communist multi-party system was 
defined by the divide between Social-Democrats (LSDP) and Conservatives 
(TS-LKD). Some national political elites were also drawn from the ranks of 
populist, liberal, peasant and green parties. The parliamentary elections in 
2000, however, significantly changed this bi-polar equilibrium of Social-
Democrats and Conservatives when two new important players, Social-Liberal 
and Liberal parties (NS-SL and LiCS), emerged on the political scene. Both 
parties embraced pro-European policies (primarily aiming to liberalize markets 
and ensure that Lithuania complied with the principle of the free movement of 
persons in Europe), with no less enthusiasm than the entrenched Social-
Democrats and Conservatives.  
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Table 1: Political Parties in Lithuanian Seimas 2004-2016 
 Political Ideology 
Seats in Party groups 
in the Dataset 
(2007-2014) 
No. of 
cases in 
the 
Dataset 
2004-08 2008-12 2012-16
Lithuanian Social 
Democratic Party 
(LSDP) 
Social-
democrat 31c 25 39c Social Democrats 53 
Liberal-Centre 
Union** 
(LiCS) 
Liberal 
(Center) 18 8c - Liberals 
44 
Liberal Movement 
of the Lithuanian 
Republic*** 
(LRLS) 
Liberal 
(right wing) - 11c 10 Liberals 
New Union/ Social-
Liberals 
(NS-LS) 
Liberal  
(left-wing) - 1 - Liberals 
Homeland Union/ 
Lithuanian Christian 
democrats* 
(TS-LKD) 
Conserva-
tive/ 
Christian 
democrat 
25 45c 33 Conservatives 47 
Order and Justice 
(Liberal Democratic 
Party) 
(TTP) 
Populist, 
conserva-
tive, 
nationalist 
11 15 11c Other 
52 
Labor Party 
(DP) 
Populist, 
social-
liberal 
39c 10 29c Other 
Lithuanian Peasant 
People Union**** 
(LVLS) 
Agrarian 
10c 3 1 Other 
National Resurrec-
tion Party 
(TPP) 
Populist, 
pro-market, 
nationalist 
- 16c - Other 
Electoral Action of 
Poles in Lithuania 
(LLRA) 
Ethnic 
minority 
(regional) 
2 3 8c Other 
Other / Non-aligned  5 4 10  
Total:   141 141 141   
Source: Lithuanian Central Electoral Commission: <http://www.vrk.lt/> accessed 18 October 2015. 
*Sąjūdis before 1993; during 1993-2008 Homeland Union-Lithuanian Conservatives.  
** Before 2003 Lithuanian Union of the Center. 
*** Until 2003, Lithuanian Liberal Union and, during 2003-2006, Party of the Liberal Union and 
the Center. 
**** Until 2004 Peasant Party. 
***** Symbol C next to number of seats in the Parliament indicates participation in ruling 
coalition. 
 
The parliamentary elections in October 2004, which were the first elections 
held after Lithuania’s entry into the EU, brought in the Labor Party (DP), a 
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newly created populist party, which was the first major political actor to voice 
criticism of the EU and to sympathize with the increasingly illiberal Russian 
political regime. Yet its leader, Viktor Uspaskich, did not keep up his populist 
rhetoric for long once elected, eagerly taking up a position as minister of the 
economy and upon which he became responsible for managing EU structural 
funds5. The parliamentary elections of 2008 and 2012 furthered the structural 
development of the Lithuanian party-system; Social-Democrats and Conserva-
tives saw their support decline, while support for populists and liberals expand-
ed. Notwithstanding, the Lithuanian political elite’s pro-European stances 
remained firm, or even intensified, as evidenced by, for instance, elites’ 
staunch support and advocacy to introduce the euro6.  
As previously observed by Steen (2015, 200), despite the ongoing Europe-
anization and internationalization of its politics and economy, recent national 
independence is part of the national consciousness even among the most liberal 
segments of the Lithuanian elite (as well as their counterparts from two other 
small and new post-communist Baltic states, Latvia and Estonia), which ex-
plains their quite surprising propensity for nationalist orientations. In the early 
XXI century the Baltic elites predominantly employed the nation-state (with its 
adjacent connotations of national pride and esteem) as the most important 
frame of reference, instead of regarding it as a toolkit providing a range of 
instruments which might be used in different combinations to solve social and 
economic problems. According to Steen (2015, 200-201) the phenomenon of 
nationalist neo-liberalism explains why the Baltic elites are sympathetic to 
national independence and skeptical of international finance. This nationalist-
neoliberal mindset of Lithuanian elites is displayed in the national economic 
austerity program, designed by the Conservative-Liberal coalition government 
in early 2009, the major parts of which were continued and further implement-
ed by a new government formed after the 2012 Seimas elections in which So-
cial-Democrats now held dominant ministerial positions. In late 2008 the Lith-
uanian government promptly and stoically adopted a national economic 
austerity program as an honorable and efficient solution to the severe economic 
downturn. This decision was strongly backed by President Grybauskaitė, who 
was outspokenly against any conditionality imposed by the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) or the EU. Appeals to national pride and self-sufficiency un-
derpinned a propensity to deal with the economic crisis ‘by ourselves’ in order 
to preserve the sovereign socio-economic decision-making power of a small 
state; a common view of the Lithuanian political elite. The heated political 
debates in Lithuania abounded with emulative references to Estonia – which 
used its previously accumulated national budget surplus to cushion the fall 
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caused by the financial shock of 2008, alongside sneering remarks about Lat-
via’s humbling request to the IMF for financial assistance. 
The national economic austerity package included drastic measures aimed at 
reducing the budget deficit. In late 2008, VAT was increased from 18% to 19% 
and later to 21%. Almost all exemptions from VAT were abolished; social 
insurance taxes for professionals, farmers and other groups were introduced 
and excise taxes for alcohol, tobacco and fuels were raised. Soon after, the 
government reduced budget expenditures; in 2009 it cut public sector wages 
and reduced pensions and other social allowances and benefits.  
2.3  The Europeanness of National Political Elite  
Higley and Burton (1989) claim that we can meaningfully talk of a consensual-
ly unified elite: its members largely share a tacit consensus about the rules of 
political conduct that restrains partisanship, and participate in an integrated 
structure of interaction that ensures reliable and effective access to each other 
and to the core of decision-making. The concept of a consensually unified elite, 
which is by and large applied at the nation-state level by researchers, can also 
be fruitfully extended to refer to a national political elite which coalesces 
around EU norms, institutions and planned future directions.  
Noteworthy, the consensually unified elite is not a uniform elite. On one hand, 
partisan identities and different interests dynamically revise the existing intra-
elite agreements, which otherwise would lead to the comprehensive consolidation 
of the elite’s inner circles and allow to abuse and dump the conflicting views. On 
the other hand, the EU opens additional windows of opportunities for national 
elites to compete and forces them to reassess the initial ideas and convictions.  
Therefore, both the national and supranational contexts impact a national 
political elite’s views and actions, especially in the domain of European gov-
ernance where national political elites are engaged in multiple roles. The repre-
sentatives of a national elite, competing at home, might display congenial atti-
tudes, become allies and support each other in their EU political careers. 
Conversely, because of the ever-increasing scope of decisions taken at the EU-
level, the EU has become a powerful conflict-generating agent, spinning new 
lines of discord inside the national political elite. On the one hand, European 
research shows that in the EU and its member-states during the last decade, and 
especially within the context of financial crisis 2008, the European project has 
become a salient and divisive issue among the elites of member-states (Best 
and Higley 2014, Viola 2015). On the other hand, more focused research 
demonstrates that international shocks in small EU member-states are particu-
larly conducive to national elite cohesion. For instance, interviews conducted in 
2012/2013 with Latvian and Lithuanian elites show that the financial crisis of 
2008 generated more united opinions, more skepticism towards international 
markets, and stronger support for national self-determination, while the elites’ 
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pro-deregulation attitudes in the internal state-market relations remained practi-
cally intact (Steen 2015, 185)7.  
In order to track the shifts and changes in national elites’ attitudes towards 
the EU, the concept of Europeanness is particularly helpful. Developed by 
Best, Lengyel and Verzichelli (2012), the term comprises the idea that there 
coexist different dimensions of attitudes (emotions, cognitions, evaluations and 
expectations) and objects (institutions, policies, strategies) related to the EU 
and that they might be appreciated in robustly differentiated modes. One can 
analytically distinguish affective, cognitive-evaluative and projective dimen-
sions of Europeanness, as it is expressed by national political elites in their 
retrospective and prospective individual-level stances towards various aspects 
of the EU. The emotional aspect of Europeanness captures personal attachment 
(positive or negative) to Europe. The cognitive-evaluative dimension of Euro-
peanness reflects trends in the elite’s concerns relative to EU matters (approval 
or disapproval of the current trends).  
Turning to Lithuania, several insights related to their Europeanness can be 
drawn from the aggregate level data on EU-related political debates and deci-
sions taking place in the country over the past decade (see sub-chapter 1.1.), 
First, the elite’s emotional attachment to Europe does not weaken. The enthusi-
asm of Lithuania’s EU accession negotiators was largely sustained and promot-
ed by Lithuanian politicians’ loyal and dutiful promotion of the European 
agenda both domestically and internationally. Yet, the question arises if the 
signs of disenchantment could not be found in the individual level data?  
Secondly, regarding the cognitive-evaluative dimension of Europeanness, the 
aggregate level data indicate that Lithuanian elites are very positive and unani-
mous in their trust and support for EU institutions and policies. However, it also 
reveals that several adjustments of attitudes are taking place. Overall, Lithuanian 
politicians are pro-European and enthusiastically support joint European initia-
tives (promoting the eastern enlargement of the EU, advocating the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, etc.). And yet, when forced to deal with troublesome 
issues, the Lithuanian political elite often rely on and revert to national-level 
solutions (the national economic austerity program of 2009, the re-introduction of 
a compulsory national conscript army in 2015, and the nationally financed lique-
fied natural gas (LNG) terminal, symbolically called Independence, in Klaipėda 
port in 2014). Do these incidents reflect shifting attitudes amongst Lithuania’s 
political elite? Are there signs of a more general reappraisal of EU institutions, 
policies and strategies, and if yes, which factors are shaping it?  
Lastly, turning to the projective dimension of Europeanness, the aggregate 
level data show that Euro-enthusiasm prevails amongst the Lithuanian political 
class. Lithuania, as one would expect from a small, new EU member-state, is 
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supportive of pooled sovereignty in international affairs. However, this support 
perceptibly drops on key financial-economic issues (most notably on the coor-
dination and integration of European economic initiatives) and it is even less 
supportive of some joint European policies in the social, cultural and civic 
spheres (such as Lithuania’s reluctance to accept the pan-European asylum 
quota policy implementation since 2014).  
We ask, then, how Lithuania’s “gradual” Euro-enthusiasm has evolved and 
how smoothly it has been distributed and shared by different groups of the 
political elite. How entrenched among Lithuanian political elites is its support 
of neoliberalism, and how concerned are they with ensuring a safe neighbor-
hood and independence from Russia? How has its lengthening experience of 
EU membership refashioned the Europeanness of the Lithuanian political elite? 
And critically, what influence, if any, has the 2008 financial crisis had on the 
Europeanness of the Lithuanian political class?  
3.  Changes in the Attitudes of Lithuanian Political Elites, 
2004-2014 
Our Lithuanian elite’s survey data will be analyzed along the three above de-
scribed dimensions of Europeanness. First, the emotional aspect of European-
ness is measured as the strength of one’s attachment to Europe (or the EU). 
Second, the cognitive-evaluative dimension of Europeanness is evaluated by 
the level of one’s trust in EU institutions, one’s attitude towards the statement 
“Unification has gone too far or should be strengthened”, one’s willingness to 
transfer authoritative decisions to the supranational (EU) level, one’s assess-
ment of the efficacy and fairness of EU decision-making, and other criteria. 
The projective dimension of Europeanness measures the extent to which one 
expects positive developments to occur in the EU (in 10 years), and is indicated 
by one’s outlook on the EU’s political, economic, social, and geopolitical fu-
ture, what one anticipates the trajectory of supranational governance and com-
mon European policies to be, and others indicators.  
3.1  Boosting European Identity  
The 2007 survey indicated that only 16% of Lithuanian political elites felt a 
strong attachment towards the EU, while the 2014 survey reveals a significant 
increase (up to 50%) in elites’ affective Europeanness. Elites’ emotional at-
tachment to Europe grew in parallel with their emotional attachment to local 
communities (regions), while the national identity in all three surveys was very 
strong (84-100%). These multiple coexisting or concentric identities – the “mar-
ble cake” phenomenon (Hermann, Risse-Kappen and Brewer 2004) – is well 
illustrated by the fact that 50% of those strongly identifying themselves with 
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regions, and 33% of those strongly identifying themselves with the nation, also 
strongly identify themselves with the EU. Party affiliation also has a rather strong 
impact upon affective identity: Liberals, Conservatives, and to a lesser degree 
Social Democrats, express strong attachment to Europe, while representatives of 
“Other” parties (in our sample dominated by the populists, with a few representa-
tives of ethnic minorities) have much more reserved feelings towards the EU. 
Positive assessment of EU unification and high frequency of contact with EU 
institutions and officials correlate with strong attachment to the EU.  
3.2  Threats to the EU: Frightened by Russia 
The Lithuanian political elite, in stark contrast to their European peers, do not 
see the largest threats to the EU as internal ones; from obstinate national inter-
ests or economic inequalities among the EU Member States (Matonyte and 
Morkevičius 2013, 111). Rather, Lithuanian elites see the biggest threat to the 
EU as coming from an external source: Russian interference with European 
affairs (see Fig. 1). In the eyes of Lithuanian politicians, the gravity of the 
threat posed by Russia has significantly increased up from 65% in 2007 to 
above 80% in 2014. This growing trend is directly related to the Russian wars 
in Georgia (2008) and in Ukraine (since 2014), which intensified feelings of 
geopolitical insecurity in Lithuania. In 2014, respondents from the Lithuanian 
political elite were worried about the lack of unanimity and resoluteness in the 
EU, although the EU did of course decide to impose restrictive measures 
against the Russian Federation in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea 
and the deliberate destabilization of neighboring Ukraine. Overall, it is difficult 
to overstate the extent to which Russia represents a significant, threatening 
Other for the Lithuanian political elite, a significance which has increased over 
the years and has steadily distanced Lithuania, a small EU member state, from 
its past colonial ties.  
Russia is not the only external threat that Europeans and Lithuanians seem 
to disagree on the seriousness of. One common worry Europeans have, one that 
Lithuania does not share, is the prospective accession of Turkey into the EU. 
Lithuanian political elites perceive it as a decreasing threat (from almost 50% 
in 2007 to about 30% in 2014). Apparently, as the likelihood of EU enlarge-
ment to Turkey has become more improbable, this has corresponded with a 
decrease in the level of religious (Christian) anxiety. The decrease in xenopho-
bic attitudes towards Turkey in 2014 also conveys the feeling of urgency to 
strengthen international defensive capacities vis-à-vis an increasingly aggres-
sive Russia. Incidentally, our data clearly indicates that those Lithuanian elites 
who strongly fear Russia tend not to consider Turkey as a big threat to the EU.  
The elite’s assessment of what they consider to be the principal internal threats 
to the EU has remained rather stable in Lithuania. After a decrease in the threat 
perception of nationalistic inclinations and economic differences among the EU 
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Member States in 2009, the trend went up again in 2014, which signals a worri-
some reaction to the financial crisis of 2008 and to Eurozone problems.  
Despite the dramatic increase in asylum-seekers and immigration since 2014, 
the Lithuanian political elite’s perception of the threat to the EU posed by immi-
gration from peoples of non-EU countries remained roughly the same during the 
entire period of our study (around 50% reporting it as a big or quite a big threat). 
In the 2014 survey, the perceived threat of immigration was falling well below 
the perceived threat posed by Russian interference in EU affairs (by 30% points), 
the economic differences among the EU Member States (by almost 10% points) 
and their nationalistic inclinations (by a bit more than 10% points).  
Figure1: Perception of Threats for the EU (Lithuanian Political Elites: 2007, 
2009, 2014) 
 
 
Older Lithuanian politicians tend to identify immigration, nationalist inclina-
tions and Turkey’s potential membership as the most pressing threats to the 
EU, whereas the younger generation is more likely to fear Russia’s interference 
in European affairs. Right-leaning Lithuanian elites largely think that immigra-
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tion, Turkey and Russia are the primary threats to the EU, whereas those on the 
left are more inclined to emphasize the threats posed by economic and social 
differences among EU Member States. One’s attachment to Europe also influ-
ences one’s perceptions of the threats. Those members of the elite who feel 
strongly attached to Europe fully appreciate the original intent of the EU, and 
are consequently more likely to view nationalism and economic inequality 
between Member States as particular vexing threats to the EU; nevertheless, 
Russia is perceived as the most worrisome threat. Those members of elite who 
do not feel strongly attached to Europe tend to highlight the perceived threat 
posed by immigration from non-EU countries and EU enlargement to Turkey. 
Those who support further EU integration tend to be more fearful of Turkey 
and Russia, while those who believe EU integration has reached or exceeded its 
appropriate limit generally emphasize the perceived threats from rising nation-
alism and economic and social differences.  
3.3  Trust in the EU Institutions: Moderate and Emotional  
The extent to which Lithuanian political elites trust EU institutions has not 
significantly changed during the period 2007-2014, remaining quite moderate 
(6-7 points on a scale from 0 to 10). The overall positive attitude Lithuanian 
elites have towards EU institutions in general does not waver noticeably be-
tween different EU institutions in particular. For instance, the differences be-
tween Lithuanian parliamentarians’ trust in the EP, the EC and the European 
Council of Ministers are negligible: in 2007 the most trusted was the EP (6.38) 
and the least trusted was the EC (6.29). In 2009, the EC became the most trusted 
(6.40) and trust in the Council of Ministers slightly decreased (to 6.19). Then, in 
2014, trust in the Council of Ministers achieved its ever-highest level (6.93), 
while trust in the EP and EC increased only slightly (respectively to 6.63 and 
6.61). This increase of trust in EU institutions in 2014 warrants further study. It 
may simply be the case that it is consistent with the general upward trend. It may 
also, however, reflect an isolated incident; namely, the Lithuanian Presidency of 
the EU Council in the second half of 2013, which was widely seen as successful 
by Lithuanian political elites, and their sentiments of trust in EU institutions may 
have been swayed accordingly (Vilpišauskas 2014a, 99).  
It is important to note that trust in EU institutions among the Lithuanian po-
litical elite is neither based on nor differentiated by partisanship. Trust is, how-
ever, differentiated according to their affective attachment to Europe and their 
cognitive-evaluative views on European unification. Those feeling the strong-
est attachment to Europe display the highest trust in EU institutions, while 
those who trust the least – although few in number – generally believe that 
European unification has been overdone.  
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3.4  Preferences of Policy Making: Support for “De-Nationalization” 
and Transnational Policies 
Lithuanian elites are inclined (more than 60% in 2014) to transfer decision 
making authority to the supranational (European) level in two transnational 
areas, immigration and environment policy; the level of support for suprana-
tional decision making in these two policy areas has significantly increased 
since 2007. Elites’ support for European decision making in anti-crime policies 
has also steadily increased; in 2014 more than 50% of the Lithuanian elite were 
willing to transfer this competence to the EU. A similar increase is found in the 
area of unemployment – rightly considered a transnational policy field because 
of the free labor movement in the EU, or at the very least, because it is largely 
unsusceptible to national-level anti-unemployment policies. Labor policies 
present a particular challenge to Lithuania, which is experiencing painfully 
large emigration to other European countries.  
Still, national political elites do wish to guard certain policy areas. The 
health care system is one such area. In 2014, only 3-4% of Lithuanian elites 
supported transferring decision making to the EU. It should be noted that there 
was a brief increase of support for transferring powers in 2009, but this was 
largely attributable to domestic politics: a conservative-liberal coalition gov-
ernment was implementing a harsh national austerity program and the health 
care sector suffered severe cuts. 
One peculiar finding is that Lithuanian political elites are keen to transfer 
powers to the EU in areas that are traditionally owned by their respective par-
ties and their own ideological leanings. For instance, left-leaning elites (in 
particular, Social Democrats) support EU governance of unemployment and 
health care. Right-leaning elites favour more EU involvement in anti-crime 
policy; on the other hand, they are reluctant to endorse common welfare poli-
cies of the EU. Those who are emotionally attached to Europe tend to support 
EU level governance in the areas of unemployment, anti-crime and health care, 
while those who are more indifferent to Europe are, unsurprisingly, not op-
posed to entrusting the EU with transnational policies on matters such as immi-
gration and environmental issues. 
3.5  Rampant Neo-Liberalism: the Quest of the Market 
Competitiveness  
Recent rhetoric in Lithuania’s public sphere would have casual observers be-
lieve social justice and the development of the welfare state were government 
priorities (Gudžinskas 2014), yet its elites continuously and increasingly favour 
free-market competitiveness over strengthening the social security system in 
the EU. In 2007 and 2009 only a slight majority (52-54%) of parliamentarians 
supported a competitive (versus socially-oriented) EU, while in 2014 their 
share had grown significantly (to 65%). This increase was even more surprising 
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since it occurred while the Seimas was dominated by Social Democrats and 
populists. This upsurge in neo-liberal attitudes conveys the Lithuanian elite’s 
approval of the national austerity-based management of the financial crisis in 
Lithuania, and is consonant with their resentment towards the EU’s costly 
rescue plans, especially the one offered to Greece. Their neo-liberal preferences 
imply that the Lithuanian political elite, across its political spectrum, favors 
economic growth at the expense of social solidarity.  
If we break elites into their respective political party affiliations, we notice 
that the biggest attitudinal shift in neo-liberal preferences occurred amongst 
Conservative party parliamentarians; amongst their ranks, those who favoured 
competitiveness grew from 54% in 2007 to 85% in 2014. Social Democrats 
also demonstrated quite a remarkable swing of neo-liberal attitudes; in early 
2007 they were evenly split between supporting competition and supporting 
social security, in 2009 the share of social security supporters jumped to 71%, 
but has since returned back to an even split.  
The dynamics of the attitudinal shifts – fluctuating between promoting eco-
nomic growth and bolstering social security – between the two leading and 
opposing parties is largely attributable to national electoral cycles, and was 
intensified by the economic crisis. Conservative party-led economic austerity 
policies began in 2009. While in opposition, the Social Democrats advocated 
for more transfers in social security. By 2014, however, the national economy 
had largely recovered under the coalition government, led by Social Demo-
crats, which permitted the Social Democrats to return back to their default 
attitude: a neo-liberal preference for increasing market competitiveness. 
There is an alternative explanation for the pro-market swing in the attitudes of 
the Lithuanian elite: they could be impressionable to the EU’s approach towards 
economic development. In 2000-2010, the Lisbon strategy outlined the first mile-
stones, while Europe 2020 provided further schemes for globally competitive 
market development in the EU. The EU could be, to put it simply, an agenda-
setter in Lithuania. This would help explain, for instance, the decrease in pro-
welfare views and the increase in neo-liberal attitudes among the Lithuanian 
Conservatives (who fervently emulate the German Christian Democrats). 
Age and party affiliation are also important factors. Older respondents, 
members of the Social Democrat Party, and politicians who position them-
selves as leftists, all believe that the EU should be socially oriented. Converse-
ly, the younger age cohort, Liberals, Conservatives, and self-positioned right-
ists, all favour a more competitive economy.  
The elite’s affective attachment to Europe, and the extent to which they have 
access to EU social networks, also has some explanatory power; Lithuanian 
politicians who feel more attached to Europe, and who have more intense con-
tacts with EU institutions and representatives, demonstrate stronger pro-
competitive attitudes.  
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3.6  Convinced Intergovernmentalists  
The bulk of the Lithuanian political elite regards the EU member-states as 
central actors in the EU, and largely rejects the idea of a centralized EU gov-
ernment. This is attuned to the argument that elites of small “newborn” states 
tend to be very vigilant about state sovereignty and their political and economic 
authority (Steen 2015, 200) The strongest pro member-state views are ex-
pressed by the Lithuanian Liberals; they are opposed to expanding EU bureau-
cracy and the increase of regulatory intervention in general. Those members of 
the Lithuanian political elite who feel strongly attached to the EU, as well as 
those who are in frequent contact with EU institutions and representatives, 
more strongly favor the EU’s intergovernmental governance than those who are 
less immersed in European networks.  
This surprising finding is best explained by the phenomenon of the “marble 
cake” and its associated concept of concentric identities (Hermann, Risse-
Kappen and Brewer 2004). As discussed in 2.1, among elites a strong identifi-
cation with the EU correlates with a strong identification with Lithuania. It 
would appear, then, that positive emotional attachment to the EU fosters patri-
otic feelings towards the nation-state Lithuania. Federalisation – the process by 
which the EC would become the principal EU government – is least acceptable 
to Lithuanian Conservatives, it is moderately supported by Social Democrats, 
and it is very acceptable to Liberals and populists. The latter are, however, 
rather skeptical towards the EU and perhaps this declarative sympathetic stance 
towards the EC represents their virulent dissatisfaction with politics at home in 
Lithuania. Yet, as observed in 2.3, among Lithuanian elites there is no signifi-
cant partisan variation in terms of trust towards the EC (and other EU institu-
tions). Therefore, the differentiated support for the federalisation of EU is 
clearly related to the ideological stances of the Lithuanian parties. The emo-
tional attachment to the EU positively correlates with the inclination to 
strengthen the EC. 
In the retrospective (2007-2009-2014), the Lithuanian elite’s support for in-
tergovernmental governance of the EU is U-curved. The retreat to member-
state centered stances in 2009 was diffused among all the reference groups 
(party affiliation, age, emotional attachment to Europe, the EU contact density, 
etc.). This temporal decrease in support for the inter-governmental governance 
was an indirect reaction to financial crisis, when the nation-state institutions 
were regarded as a better problem-solver, and while the EU was considered as 
a lender of the last resort.  
3.7  EU Fairness and Responsiveness: Grievances of a Small State 
The Lithuanian political elite largely believes that they are unfairly treated by 
the EU. Slightly less persecuted views are held by those elites with a stronger 
emotional attachment to the EU, those who favor further strengthening the EU, 
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and those who have denser European networks. Established political parties in 
Lithuania tend to see fairness in EU politics, while the various populist parties 
are more skeptical about the EU. The attitude that the process of EU decision 
making gives too much weight to some (large) EU member-states is steadfast. 
The Lithuanian elite’s perception that the EU mistreats its smaller states did not 
change during the period 2007-2014. 
3.8  Projective Expectations for the EU Future: “Yes” to the 
Common EU Foreign Policy, but “No” to Common Taxation 
and Social Security 
Views about the EU’s future (in next 10 years) (see Fig. 2) display two general 
trends. First, the Lithuanian elite are rather united in their support (around 
90%) for common EU foreign policy and for more assistance to the EU regions 
experiencing social and economic difficulties. However, quite a different trend 
is associated with the elite’s attitudes towards the unification of the EU taxation 
and social security systems. Since 2009 the support for common taxation and 
social security system has dropped from 70% to 50%.  
The strong and unequivocal support for common EU foreign policy reflects 
the willingness of elites from a small state, bordering Russia, to be part of a 
bigger whole and to benefit from pooled sovereignty in international relations, 
especially given the increasingly insecure contemporary geopolitical environ-
ment. The unified support of Lithuania’s political elite for providing assistance 
to those EU regions that are experiencing social and economic difficulties also 
conveys the structural interests and appreciation of a new EU member-state, 
which is a net recipient of EU assistance. Meanwhile, the sharp decline in 
Lithuanian support for the pan-European common taxation and social security 
system is related to the hard evidence that the EU has inefficiently dealt with 
the prolonged economic crisis, particularly, in Greece. From another perspec-
tive, Lithuanians take pride in their success in dealing with the financial crisis 
on their own; they proudly trumpet that “I did it my way”, so to speak.  
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Figure 2: Projections of the EU in the Next 10 Years (Lithuanian Political Elites: 
2007, 2009, 2014) 
 
 
Political ideologies significantly determine elite’s support for the future unifi-
cation of EU policies. Leftists, more so than rightists, support the idea of uni-
fied taxation, a common social security system, and the provision of assistance 
for regions experiencing difficulties. Those who think that the main aim of the 
EU is to provide better social security (versus economic competitiveness) gen-
erally support the idea of common social security and taxation, and are in fa-
vour of offering more regional assistance.  
The visions that Lithuania’s elites have for the future of the EU is linked with 
their relative affective attachments to Europe. Quite apparently, strong emotional 
attachment to Europe signifies concomitant support for a more unified future 
Europe. Those who believe that European unification has already gone too far are 
hostile to future movement towards unified EU foreign policies, increased re-
gional assistance, and common taxation or social security systems.  
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3.9  Steady Support for European Unification 
Support for further European unification (see Fig. 3) amongst Lithuanians 
changed hardly at all during the past ten years. Lithuanian elites stayed unified in 
their moderate (but in comparison to the other EU member-states, quite high) 
support for further EU expansion (6-7 points on the 11 point scale). In 2014, there 
was a slight decrease in support for further unification; it is not certain, but this 
trend may have been a temporary reaction to the financial crisis of 2008.  
Variations in support for European unification are largely drawn along ideo-
logical and experiential lines. In Lithuania, the left leaning elite strongly sup-
port European unification. Also, and not surprisingly, those who have lived in 
another EU country, and those who feel a strong attachment to Europe, tend to 
support additional European unification. The biggest enthusiasts of further 
unification are elites in their old age; their generation spearheaded the Europe-
an integration process in this small post-communist country, and they have 
apparently remained staunch proponents.  
Figure 3: Attitude Towards European Unification (Lithuanian Political Elites: 
2007, 2009, 2014) 
 
Mean (scale from 0: “Has already gone too far” to 10: “Should be strengthened”). 
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3.10  Attitudes Towards the Economic Crisis Management:  
National Governments at the Forefront  
In order to combat the financial crisis of 2008, the Lithuanian political elite (and 
the newly appointed Conservative-Liberal coalition government) implemented a 
harsh national austerity program starting in early 2009 (see sub-chapter 1.2). 
Driven by a nationalistic, self-reliant mood, the elites expressed a willingness to 
avoid the intervention and control of the EU (or, for that matter, the IMF). This 
defiant sentiment may be traced to a lingering resentment among the Lithuanian 
political elite related to their unsuccessful attempt to introduce the euro in 2007; 
Lithuania’s financial and economic indicators did not withstand the tough scruti-
ny of EU authorities, and Lithuania failed by a small margin. Later on, however, 
after having successfully implemented national austerity policies and in a much 
different financial climate, Lithuania reengaged its euro-currency initiative. The 
willingness and resoluteness of the Lithuanian elite to introduce the euro in 2015 
was as much a strong emotional show of support for the Euro-zone as it was a 
mere pragmatic calculation, seeking to reach a tangible immediate utility 
(Vilpišauskas 2014b, 240-242). Moreover, for Lithuanians the euro-currency also 
symbolically meant distancing itself from Russia even further, and a big step 
towards further European integration. 
These national circumstances are reflected in Lithuania’s political elite’s at-
titudes towards the management of the economic crisis in early 2009. The 2009 
survey shows that the prevailing mindset of Lithuanian political elites towards 
the economic crisis management was nationalistic. The top strategies for han-
dling economic problems were perceived to be either autonomous or coordinat-
ed actions of national governments. The external intervention scenarios (EU or 
international financial institutions) were perceived to be the least desirable 
solutions. In fact, the national austerity program initiated by the Lithuanian 
government perfectly corresponded with the opinions expressed in our survey. 
Even though there were important differences in political party stances on the 
harshness of austerity measures (for instance, Social-Democrats, then in par-
liamentary opposition, were asking for more social security), the survey data 
indicated no significant differences among parties in their overall preference 
for the national government-led economic crisis management strategy.  
4.  Conclusions 
During the first decade of Lithuania’s EU membership, the European project 
did not produce any sharp dividing lines between the country’s political elites. 
Lithuanian politicians remained consensually united and committed to the EU. 
They continue to positively assess their membership in the EU, increasingly 
express their support for the transfer of decision-making authority to suprana-
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tional level, and are willing to further strengthen and enlarge the EU. Domestic 
political quarrels did not spill-over to the generally pro-European stances of 
Lithuania’s political elite.  
The financial crisis of 2008 could have threatened this consensus, but as we 
can clearly see now, as Lithuania navigated itself through the crisis by impos-
ing upon itself a national austerity program, the political elite displayed in-
creasing levels of Europeanness. Even though in general the Lithuanian politi-
cal elite believes the EU unfairly treats Lithuanian interests, those attitudes are 
changing and Lithuanian politicians’ support for the transfer of decision-
making authority to the supranational level has been increasing. Strong pro-
European positions are expressed by the Lithuanian elite’s unequivocal and 
mounting promotion of a common foreign policy strategy. Geopolitical consid-
erations attend this, and Lithuania’s political elite increasingly considers Russia 
to pose an ominous threat and is alarmed by its interference in EU affairs. The 
Russian factor strongly anchors the Europeanness of Lithuania’s political elite 
and bolsters their unity. This corroborates Steen’s findings that in the Baltic 
states, neoliberal policies became a strategic means for indigenous control of 
the titular nation (i.e. Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian elites) in order to accom-
plish the paramount goal of safeguarding the reborn small nation-states against 
external threats (Steen 2015, 201). Our longitudinal case study of Lithuanian 
elites extends these insights into a more robust understanding of the develop-
ment of the Europeanized nationalist type of neo-liberalism in the Baltic states. 
Before the financial crisis of 2008, it was mostly most visible in Estonia, easily 
detectable in Latvia, but not evident in Lithuania (Steen 2015, 198). After this 
huge international shock, however, it has now become visible across the entire 
political spectrum in Lithuania. Thus, we can safely generalize that the Baltic 
states (or, at least, their national elites) display a strong and sustainable trend of 
the Europeanized national neo-liberalism with all of its implications in social, 
economic and political domains. 
However, Lithuania’s political elite are not uniform in their attitudes to-
wards the EU. Although party polarization is not pronounced in Lithuania, the 
members of various political parties and ideologies differ in their Europeanness 
according to noticeable patterns. Left-leaning political elites are to a much 
greater extent than the rightists interested in the transfer of unemployment and 
health care policies to supranational level, while right-leaning elites are more 
inclined to transfer the anti-crime policies to the EU. Social-Democrats are 
more supportive of common taxation and social security system in the EU, and 
they more strongly favor further strengthening the EU, than do either the Con-
servatives or the Liberals. In Lithuania, the intergovernmental vision of the EU 
is articulated by the Conservatives, while the Liberals are strongly committed 
that the member-states should remain central actors in the EU.  
Two socio-demographic variables stand out as key indicators of the Lithuani-
an political elite’s Europeanness: age, and personal embeddedness into European 
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networks. The affective attachment to Europe of those Lithuanian elite who have 
dense EU networks is higher. The younger elite, to a much greater extent, per-
ceive Russia as a threat to the EU. Yet it is the older elite who are more support-
ive of the idea that the EU should be further integrated and enlarged.  
This longitudinal study of Lithuanian political elites illustrates that interac-
tions between the three major dimensions of Europeanness (its affective, cog-
nitive-evaluative and projective dimensions) are strongly interrelated. Currently 
in Lithuania the political elite’s Europeanness manifests itself through their 
increasingly high affective attachment to Europe, which compensates for a 
slight decrease in their cognitive-evaluative stance, and their projective support 
for future European unification is stable.   
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